against it. Who would deny that better judges understand more, not less? In light of this, might West be better of claiming that, today, judges are either: 1) less interested in understanding the full facts surrounding the legal disputes they are charged with resolving, including the "personal" facts speaking to the "state of mind" of a party, which often remain legally relevant; or 2) less perceptive in apprehending those facts? Put otherwise, might she be better off framing the question as involving a reduced level of curiosity or insight amongst contemporary judges?
West cites the recent public/political debates in which the model of the empathetic judge took a major beating -including the attack on President Obama for indicating during his campaign a desire to appoint empathetic judges to the bench, the attack on Supreme Court nominees Sonya Sotomayor on the grounds (in light of earlier statements she had made) that she might herself be one of those empathetic judges, and Chief Justice John Roberts's insistence in the opening statement of his confirmation hearing that it is the job of the judge to act as a dispassionate umpire calling balls and strikes. The charge in these political dust-ups was that empathy in judging is contrary to the rule of law. West raises the possibility that the attack on empathy in judging here by conservatives -although phrased in general terms -may have, in reality, been a critique of selective empathy. As she writes, "the target of the anti-empathy argument is not empathy per se but selective empathy" by progressives/liberals. Actually, at least so far as this political sparring is concerned, it seems to me that this is precisely right. In contemporary political discourse, empathy almost always means liberal empathy. Although West's focus is largely on questions of private law (like the contract dispute in Williams v.
Walker- Thomas) , in constitutional law, the empathizing judge invariably feels the need for welfare rights, abortion rights, gay rights, the political and religious dissenter, the criminal defendant, etc. -the entire panoply of policy positions that identify a contemporary judge as "liberal." 4 As such, an empathizing Court is a liberal Court. 5 And a conservative Court is heartless. It seems clear to me that contemporary conservatives are attacking selective liberal empathy -something that is apparent not only in these political conflicts, but in politicized "empathy" scholarship in the legal academy. 6 There is, incidentally, no better case of the consonance of the use of the term "empathy"
as synonymous with liberalism (as conservatives understand perfectly) than West's exemplar of the empathetic judge, Judge J. Skelly Wright.
J. Skelly Wright: Scientist
Judge Wright was a southerner from New Orleans who grew up poor, and who struggled economically during the Great Depression. 7 As the first district judge to place a school board under an injunction ordering a desegregation plan, and, in turn, the first district judge to draw up his own desegregation plan in the face of inaction by a board, Wright was a pioneer in wielding judicial power aggressively to advance social reform. 8 He was also a staunch defender of Warren Court activism. 9 Wright certainly described the process of judging in a way that one suspects West would celebrate. "Courts," Wright wrote, in a well-known article in the Cornell Law Review, "are concerned with the flesh and blood of an actual case. This tends to modify, perhaps to lengthen, everyone's view. It also provides an extremely salutary proving ground for all abstractions; it is conducive, in a phrase of Holmes, to thinking things, not words, and thus to the evolution of a principle by a process that tests as it creates." 10 Thomas Grey described Wright as a judge "with a stronger than usual sense of substance over form." 11 Michael Bernick describes him as a judge with "the ability to pierce through formalisms, and the innumerable complexities and subtleties, to see the essential truths within." 12 relationship to the emergent modern administrative state. 21 In making this point -despite the fact that she thinks that Skelly Wright's ruling in Williams v. Walker-Thomas is an exception to this trend on the liberal/Realist side rather than yet another illustration of it -I think she is absolutely right.
Is Wright -who celebrated "government as a social instrument," and the role of judges as its helpmeet --really that different from West's bête noire, the judge as "master of economics, statistics and the slide rule, rather than the master of Blackstone or black letter law." (West, 7).
Not if we look to the one of Wright's progenitors, Herbert Croly's, who, e.g., striking re-imaging of the symbol of justice under a progressive state:
Instead of having her eyes blindfolded, she would wear perched upon her nose a most searching and forbidding pair of spectacles, once which combined the vision of a microscope, a telescope, and a photographic camera. Instead of holding scales in her hand, she might perhaps be figured as possessing a much more homely and serviceable set of tools. She would have a hoe with which to cultivate the social garden, a watering pot with which to refresh it, a barometer with which to measure the pressure of the social air, and the indispensible typewriter and filing cabinet with which to record the behavior of society.
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The paradigm shift within law to a focus on systems, as opposed to individuals, is of enormous significance. Historically, it is a major progressive -not conservative - The Senn case involved the legality of picketing which destroyed the company of a (very) small businessman. Paul Senn ran his Milwaukee tile-laying company mostly out of his home, did a significant amount of the work with his own hands (though he employed a handful of journeymen and helpers, depending on the amount of work available), and barely made enough money to support his wife and four children -all the more difficult during the depths of the Great Depression. His business was initially not unionized. It became a target of the Milwaukee's Tile Layer's Union, whose objective was to fully unionize the city's tile-laying industry. Notably, the objective of unionizing Senn came from outside the company -it was not sought by his employees, who were, by all accounts happy with the way things were. But a union-based collective system requires that all in the industry be folded into the system nevertheless so the unionized businesses were not undercut in the tile-laying market (re wages, hours, conditions, etc., which, to sustain the system, had be standardized).
Remarkably, however, this was not a case of a company resisting unionization. Senn agreed to unionize his small company, and to follow all the benchmark standards of the system.
The snag, though, was that that system required the hermetic separation of "labor" from "management" for systemic regulatory purposes. The Tile Layer's Union demanded that Senn totally refrain from doing any more of the tile -laying work with his own hands; that is, that he re-adjust the nature of the work he did personally, so as to become, unambiguously, "management" and not "labor." This, Senn insisted, he simply could not afford to do. The union then set upon him to drive him out of business, with picketing and other forms of direct action, which sought to tar his business with the label "unfair to labor." Traditionally, Senn would have had common law protections against this type of injury to his business. But the Norris LaGuardia Act was aimed at eliminating those protections to promote unionization. In a bone-chilling piece of systems analysis, Justice Brandeis dismissed the notion that empathy for Senn's plight was in any way relevant to the Court's decision: the modern world needed to be organized according to collectivities, and, as the world was remade anew, Senn's suffering was simply a bump in the road.
One can find empathy in abundance --with a heavy focus on the parties to the case itself, and, more generally, the entire public law litigation movement, as brilliantly anatomatized in a famous Harvard Law Review article by Abram Chayes. 27 The whole point of this form of litigation, as Chayes lucidly explained, is to abstract from the parties to the lawsuit themselves, to draft them into service as vehicles for leveraging the courts to initiate significant, system-wide changes in public policy.
The Traditional Judge
This raises for me a basic question: who is this creature that West is yearning for here, Who is this profoundly moral, imaginative, listening judge without paradigm, sensitive only to the individualized case, and the people before him, in all the richness of their humanity?
When did he sit? He is (as Max Weber described the model, and ideal) a kadi -a wise man under a tree (though Martin Shapiro details how even the actual kadis didn't really fit the picture). 29 He is Solomon.
The System is the Empathy: The New Deal
Let me nominate a Solomon for our time, albeit a fictional one, depicted on film.
William Wellman's remarkable (pre-Code) Wild Boys of the Road (1933) culminates in a courtroom scene in which an initially non-empathetic judge -with the National Recovery Administration's Blue Eagle emblem looking down over his shoulder --pulls back from the brink of hard, law-like decision, and rules in a case-specific, compassionate, human way. 30 The film is not just set during the Great Depression. It is all about the economic collapse, and the enormous human cost that entailed. The movie's heroes are two mischievous, but warm-hearted small-town teenage boys whose parents lose their jobs to the economic cataclysm. Not wanting to be a burden to their families, who can no longer support them, the boys, in a cross-country odyssey, join an army of others in hitting the rails, hopping freights looking for work. They soon meet a girl of about the same age in a boxcar -dressed as a boy -who becomes their boon companion. Along the way, life is hard, but the three are strong: they face down rail-yard bulls, inhabit squatter camps (and, briefly, a Chicago brothel, while bedding down temporarily with the girl's prostitute aunt) --until, inevitably, they are driven out by police (in one scene -but certainly not all -the police are portrayed as empathetic to the teenagers plight --"How do you think I feel?" snaps one, "I have kids at home myself.)" But the police turn on the firehoses nonetheless, and the trio is forced to move on yet again. Along the way, one of them (Tommy)
loses his leg to a freight train, and must hobble about on makeshift crutch (Tommy's life is saved by doctor who is willing to treat him for free, after the kids rouse the Doctor at his home late at night; he amputates Tommy's leg, not in a hospital but -without anesthesia, outside, by the light of a bonfire -in a squatter's camp).
The film's youthful protagonists end up living with hundreds of others in New York City shantytown, and set out to look for work. Remarkably, the other boy, Eddie, finds a job as an elevator operator. There's a catch, though. He must buy an Alpaca coat to work the job, and he needs to do so immediately. Desperate, Eddie hits the streets to panhandle. The girl (Sally) tap dances on the sidewalks of Manhattan for coins. And then, in what finally seems like his big break, two men offer to give Eddie more than the amount he needs if he will go across the street to a movie theatre cashier, hand her a note, and bring them the box she will give him (the men tell the credulous Eddie that the cashier is a relative of theirs, who, they can't be seen with). Of course, the note demands the cashbox, the teller screams, and the Eddie -on the cusp of at long last finding work --is arrested.
This is how he comes before a judge, in a New York City juvenile court. The apparently stern judge seems to regard Eddie and his friends as petty criminals. He asks for some basic facts: What are your names? Who are your parents? Where do you live? They tell him nothing. If they are going to be that way, the judge lectures them sternly, the law gives him no choice but to lock them up. "Tell me the whole story," the judge pleads. "Let me be your friend.
I want to help you."
Sure you do, Eddie says, with dripping skepticism. But soon he breaks down, launching into a bitter, heart-breaking lament about riding the rails and homelessness, and the spreading joblessness, and his despair, and the despair of others across the country, before dissolving in tears. The camera then pans up to the wall behind the judge, as Eddie weeps: we see the Blue
Eagle emblem, bold and proud, with its inscribed motto --"We Do Our Part." The judge has clearly been affected (after this scene, he goes into his chambers, and gazes at an autographed photo on his desk reading "To Dad" from his own teenage son, whose image, we learn, was weighing on his heard and mind at this moving courtroom moment with Eddie). "I'm going to do my part, now I want you to do yours," the judge tells Eddie. "I know that things are going to get better soon," he tells them, in an apparent allusion to the New Deal. "We'll find a spot for you. You'll all be given a chance." The promises to get all three of them jobs, and help them, thereby, to eventually re-unite with their families.
The liberal judge in this case is clearly the picture of empathy -which the scene underlines. But, ultimately, the boys will be saved by the system itself. They will be integrated into it, though the programs of the New Deal. All -government officials, businesses (proudly displaying the Blue Eagle logo), and ordinary people will commit to doing their part to support the system -as against the old common law order. It is the system itself which is compassionate and empathetic. In the modern world, this is how things are done. imagination of the nature of the judicial process was an important part of that process.
Conclusion
The old Blackstonian common law order that West looks back upon wistfully was hardly empathetic, nor were its judges more in touch with their emotions, nor those of the parties appearing before them. 32 As the legal modernists who sought to replace it with more progressive, policy-focused understandings recognized, the concerns for power and equality had to be embedded as animating features of the activist modern administrative state. Far from entailing a movement from formalism to an open, experimental pragmatism (at least in any simple sense), it involved a displacement of one set of value-laden legal formalism with others.
33
In many respects a product of the Great Depression itself -Wright, in fact, was not much older 31 It might be useful in this regard to consider what John Stuart Mill -negatively reflecting on his father and Jeremy Bentham (of course a great enemy of the common law, and a clear proponent of the modern state) --referred to as the "dissolving influence of analysis." Mill, Autobiography (chapter on "A Crisis in My Mental History"). This is very much about the way the role of feelings in imagination and understanding, something Mill tells us he neglected in his commitment to liberal reform the point of total mental collapse -a profound mental depression. 32 But Wright's words about using government -and law -as a "social instrument" betray this misapprehension of the nature of his own endeavors. With hindsight, we should be able to see this nature a lot more clearly. If Wright is appearing more empathetic, it is because the substantive and systematic political ideology in whose crucible his views were forged, and of which he is a paradigmatic judicial exemplar, is, as a system, with its own (sometimes rigid, even blinding) categories and formalisms, more empathetic. It is not because Wright hears each case on its own, unique terms, understanding it richly and fully, intellectually, and emotionally, as a prelude to doing "what's right," like some latter-day kadi or Solomon -or as wise, Blackstonian common law judges once did in some dimly imagined -but possibly retrievable? -days of old.
